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Abstract: It is argued that responsible therapeutic preaching is theocentric. Such
preaching points listeners to the divine therapy in the text. God’s therapy is God’s
healing love expressed through compassion, understanding, acceptance, and
forgiveness. When an appropriate text presents itself, counseling psychology can
be employed to fund analogues that are not only illustrative of God’s therapeutic
action portrayed in the scripture passage, but which also have the power to
stimulate openness to that therapeutic action. It is further argued that the analo-
gical work in the therapeutic sermon should take its lead from analogia fidei, but
also incorporate analogia entis.
Zusammenfassung: Es wird die Behauptung aufgestellt, dass verantwortliche
therapeutische Predigt theozentrisch ist. Solche Predigt verweist die Hörer auf die
göttliche Therapie im Text. Gottes Therapie ist Gottes heilende Liebe, die sich in
Mitleid, Verständnis, Annahme und Vergebung ausdrückt. Wo sich ein passender
Text bietet, kann Psychologie Analogien beisteuern, die nicht nur Gottes thera-
peutisches Handeln im Evangelium aufzeigen, sondern die auch Offenheit für das
therapeutische Handeln erzeugen können. Es wird ferner argumentiert, dass die
Arbeit mit Analogien in der therapeutischen Predigt von analogia fidei geleitet
sein sollte, aber auch analogia entis einschliessen sollte.
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Therapeutic preaching has its fair share of critics.1 The primary reason is that the
term is often associated with a form of preaching in which the gospel is psycholo-
1 See, for example, Kay Northcutt, Kindling Desire for God. Preaching as Spiritual Direction,
Minneapolis (Fortress) 2009, chp 2; G. Lee Ramsey, Care-full Preaching. From Sermon to Caring
Community, St. Louis (Chalice Press) 2000, chp 1; Mike Graves, God of Grace and Glory, in:
M. Graves, ed., What’s the Matter with Preaching Today? Louisville (Westminster John Knox)
2004, 109–125; and Thomas Long, No News is Bad News, in: M. Graves, ed., What’s the Matter
with Preaching Today? Louisville (Westminster John Knox) 2004, 145-157.
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gized. Common forms of human suffering such as anxiety, depression, workplace
stress, relationship problems, and grief and loss are addressed from the pulpit
and mini-doses of therapy are administered to ease the pain. Preaching should be
about God’s saving act in Christ. What the therapeutic preachers give us instead,
so the complaint goes, is half-baked serves of psychotherapy. Despite the pro-
blems, therapeutic preaching can be rehabilitated. I contend that what we need is
theocentric therapeutic preaching. Therapeutic preaching needs to be construed
as pointing listeners to divine therapy. God’s therapy is God’s healing love
expressed through compassion, understanding, acceptance, and forgiveness.
The understanding of preaching that my approach is constructed around is
that the sermon is essentially an announcement of God’s grace in Christ. That God
in Christ should be at the center of the sermon is the core message of the
Reformers, neo-orthodox theologians, theologians of the new hermeneutic, post-
liberal theologians, and leading contemporary homileticians such as Tom Long,
Paul Scott Wilson, David Buttrick, William Willimon, Fred Craddock, and Mike
Graves. In line with this general thrust, I contend that therapeutic preaching
needs to have God’s therapy rather than psychology as its primary focus.
I propose an analogical approach to theocentric therapeutic preaching. When
an appropriate text presents itself, psychotherapeutic psychology can be em-
ployed to fund analogues that are not only illustrative of God’s therapeutic action
portrayed in the scripture passage, but which also have the power to stimulate
openness to that therapeutic action. That is to say, the analogical theology in the
sermon is not simply didactic; it is also catalytic of deeper openness to divine
therapy.
A debate has been going on for a very long time between Roman Catholic and
Protestant theologians over the right understanding of analogical God-talk. As is
well known, two main approaches have been proposed—namely, analogia entis
(analogy of being) and analogia fidei (analogy of faith). The former is associated
with Catholic theology; the latter with theologians of the Word such as Karl Barth
and Eberhard Jüngel. In very general terms, the analogy of being assigns primacy
to knowledge of the being of God, while the analogy of faith privileges knowledge
of the action of God received through faith. While some Protestant theologians
flatly reject the analogy of being, I will argue below that it is appropriate to
incorporate it into theological reflection, as long as it is subordinated to the
analogy of faith. I will further argue that when we use therapeutic analogues in
pastoral preaching, it is proper to take our lead from the analogy of faith (God’s
communication of therapy in Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit), but also
to incorporate analogy of being (reference to human therapeutic virtues gives us a
revealing glimpse—and it is no more than that—of God’s healing love, compas-
sion, and acceptance). It will be noted that here primacy is assigned to God in the
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analogical relation. In using therapeutic analogues in a sermon, a preacher needs
to be careful lest she give the impression that her message is that God is like a
therapist. Rather, what needs to shape her approach in sermon preparation and
delivery is the notion that God’s therapy is the condition of the possibility of all
human therapy.
The essay has the following structure. There is first a discussion on correla-
tional preaching. Since I am arguing for a correlation between psychotherapeutic
psychology and divine therapy, it is important to note the main objections to the
correlational approach and to offer cogent responses. In the second section, there
is a treatment of analogical God-talk. The main positions—namely, analogia entis,
analogia fidei, and a combination of the two—are outlined and critically reviewed.
The third and final section consists of an outline of the basic principles that
emerge from this discussion of analogical theology pertaining to the responsible
use of therapeutic analogues in preaching.
Correlational Preaching
In his essay on correlational preaching, Ronald Allen avers that the concepts,
symbols, and language in the text that is the focus of the sermon need to be
shaped to accord with the worldview of the modern person.2 Allen contends that
the sermon “needs to ask the congregation to believe and do things that are
intelligible in the contemporary world.” Tillich clearly has this in mind in his
famous sermon, ‘You are Accepted.’3 ‘Sin’ and ‘grace’ are deemed to be strange
words for the modern person. Two new words—words that are likely to be
immediately meaningful for the 20th century person—are proffered: ‘alienation’
and ‘acceptance.’ The clear danger here is that in the translation exercise the
inner meaning of the text is partially or even totally lost. Hans Frei draws
attention to this problem in a number of places in his writings. He refers to the
problem of ‘the great reversal’ effected by the ‘mediating theologians.’ For this
group of theologians, interpretation is “a matter of fitting the biblical story into
another world with another story rather than incorporating that world into the
biblical story.”4 What Frei and the other narrative theologians plead for is entry
into the biblical world on its own terms. In this approach, the biblical narratives
are construed as realistic, as ‘history-like.’ Frei refers to the “curious, unmarked
2 See Ronald Allen, Preaching as Mutual Critical Correlation through Conversation, in: J. Child-
ers, ed., Purposes of Preaching, St. Louis (Chalice Press) 2004, 1–22.
3 See Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, Harmondsworth (Penguin Books) 1966.
4 Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, New Haven (Yale University Press) 1974, 130.
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frontier between history and realistic fiction” that one finds in the Bible.5 The
interpreter of the Bible should aim to “set forth a temporal world,” as this is the
way in which the realistic narratives make sense. Here, of course, we hear an echo
of Barth’s famous call to bravely enter “the strange world of the Bible.” From this
perspective, it is deemed that the correlational preacher runs a very real risk of
constructing her own world. The concepts from the cultural self-interpretations
that she employs, far from illuminating the deeper meaning of the symbols in the
text, actually distort it. The biblical narrative is twisted out of shape in order to
meet the taste, interests, and assumptions of the modern person. What about,
inquires the narrative theologian, telling the biblical stories in all their depth and
power so that the modern person is formed by them?
The problem of ‘the great reversal’ is a very real one for the preacher employ-
ing a correlational approach. There is an ever-present temptation to allow the
concepts from psychology or philosophy to take over. The various parts of the text
are manipulated until they align with the contemporary discourse. If the correla-
tional preacher is to avoid this pitfall, she needs to be firmly committed to
maintaining the integrity of the text. In her interpretive work, she needs to allow
the meaning to unfold rather than forcing it to align with a pre-understanding
conditioned by a particular psychological or philosophical theory. The concepts
from whatever theory is used are meant to bring out important aspects of the
deep, inner meaning of the text. The psychological or philosophical theory is the
servant of the text, not its master.
Framing the task of the preacher in this way brings me into conflict with the
approach that the narrative theologian, Mark Ellingsen, advocates. He construes
the task of theology as describing the character and identity of the world of the
Bible. The task of preaching he sees as telling the Bible’s stories about that world.
Ellingsen contrasts his narrative approach with that of the correlational preacher:
“[W]hen preaching becomes understood as the task of narrating the biblical account,
Scripture effectively functions as its own interpreter. It interprets itself insofar as such
preaching rejects the imposition of extraneous categories upon itself, and it allows its
narratives to speak for themselves.”6
Ellingsen’s argument is that Scripture is self-interpreting; reading it through a
lens supplied by an “alien” discipline constitutes a failure to allow it to speak for
itself. I contend that provided the lens is appropriate and is properly applied, the
5 Ibid., 150.
6 Mark Ellingsen, The Integrity of Biblical Narrative. Story in Theology and Proclamation,
Eugene (Wipf & Stock) 1990, 19.
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text will speak even more clearly than it would in an unaided interpretation.
Tillich puts it well: “[The one] who reads Ecclesiastes or Job with eyes opened by
existentialist analyses will see more in either than he was able to see before. The
same is true of many other passages of the Old and New Testaments.”7 What
Tillich says in relation to existentialist thought can, of course, be more widely
applied to include other cultural self-interpretations. I am advocating the use of
psychotherapeutic psychology as an aid to biblical interpretation because I am
convinced that it helps us to grasp an important aspect of the meaning of the text
that would otherwise have remained hidden.
Of course anyone who follows the theological line of Karl Barth will necessa-
rily reject my argument. Barth holds to the absolute primacy of the revealed
divine Word; it is the sole source and criterion for theology. He rejects the claim
that psychology, philosophy or any other cultural discipline captures the deep
meaning of human existence. The Word alone is illuminating; we are the ones
who are illuminated by it. Our sin prevents us from truly understanding who and
what we are: “Human sin excludes us from understanding human nature except
by a new disclosure through the perception of divine grace addressed to [the
human] and revealing and affirming true humanity in the midst of human sin,
i.e., a disclosure which is genuinely new, involving faith in the divine revela-
tion.”8 In the end, the rightness or wrongness of this approach is a question of
judgment. The mediating theologians take the view that, despite their limitations,
philosophy and the human sciences do reveal something really important about
the nature of human existence. Moreover, it is held that these disciplines have
insights that are not fully present in the scriptures. It is acknowledged that the
ideas developed by the philosophers and the psychologists, or at least most of
these ideas, are implied in biblical stories and teachings—and sometimes even
explicitly dealt with. Freud’s notion of unconscious conflict, Jung’s archetypes,
the existentialist concepts of estrangement, meaninglessness, guilt, and despair,
and more can all be found in either implicit or explicit form in the Bible. Accord-
ing to correlational theologians, what the cultural self-interpretations provide is
an alternative way of interpreting the basic existential categories that the biblical
writers knew about. The alternative development of the categories is grounded in
sophisticated and penetrating analysis. Barth looks at these analyses and simply
comments that sometimes they confirm in a general way the insights provided by
the revealed Word. This is to be expected, and it is not particularly exciting. It is
7 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology II, Chicago (University of Chicago Press) 1957, 28.
8 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III.2, 44; cited in Peter Harrison, Correlation and Theology. Barth
and Tillich Re-examined, in: Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 15, 1, 1986, 65–76, esp. 71.
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interesting to observe the correspondence, but the theologian does not need to
have her work confirmed by cultural self-interpretations:
“[Theological anthropology] is led to statements which are very similar to those in which
humanity is described from a very different angle (e.g., by the pagan Confucius, the atheist
L. Feuerbach, and the Jew M. Buber)…We need not be surprised that there are approxima-
tions and similarities. Indeed, in this very fact we may even see a certain confirmation of our
results—a confirmation which we do not need and which will not cause us any particular
excitement…”9
This statement points up the essential difference in the approaches of a Barthian
and a correlationalist. The correlationalist does get excited when she finds lines
of connection between a Christian symbol and a piece of cultural self-interpreta-
tion. Moreover, she contends that for her work to be relevant she needs to
correlate it with the questions and answers that the creative thinkers in the
culture are generating. While it is true that it is most often the case that only a
relatively small number of people in a given congregation on a Sunday morning
are well-versed in contemporary psychological and philosophical thinking, the
majority have sucked in the air surrounding these disciplines. That is, they think
in the general categories provided by the psychologists and the philosophers.
Terms such as unconscious thought, repression, self-actualization, alienation,
angst, meaninglessness, and despair float around in their consciousness and
generate existential questions and concerns. The correlational preacher rejects
the view that these categories do not need to be explicitly addressed. She does not
accept that simply telling the biblical story creates its own relevance. It is the
contention of the correlational preacher that explicitly drawing lines between the
experience and thought of those inhabiting the contemporary and the biblical
worlds is an indispensable contribution to a meaningful and impacting sermon.
In the end, all this is of course a matter of judgment. Some preachers will be
strongly drawn to the idea that the two worlds need to be correlated. Others will
support Frei and the narrative preachers who follow him in the contention that
correlation in theology (and preaching) results in the “the great reversal” that is
so lamentable. Those who take this line argue for scripture as self-interpreting;
psychology or any other non-theological discipline is considered to be alien to the
world of the Bible. My view, clearly, is that creative cultural self-interpretations—
in the present context, those of the psychotherapists—can be very profitably
employed. But I also recognize the force in the counter-arguments. It is easy—
frighteningly so—to apply the psychological concepts irresponsibly and so to
9 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III.2, 277; cited in Harrison, Correlation and Theology (n. 8), 71.
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distort the inner meaning of the text. The correlational preacher needs to be
disciplined and honest with herself lest she fall into this trap.
The kind of correlational work in preaching that I am proposing has a
particular form. The aim is to find in psychotherapeutic theory suitable analogues
to the divine therapy that features in the text. It is argued that such work should
take its lead from analogia fidei, but may incorporate analogia entis.
Analogia Fidei, Analogia Entis, and
Psychotherapeutic Analogues in Preaching
A good place to begin is with Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas employs analogia entis in
his discussion on the names of God. The question of the divine names, in turn, is
indissolubly linked to the question of the knowability of God. In order to assign a
name to something, it must be known.
Aquinas asks whether or not it is within the capability of human beings to
name God (STI.13.1).10 In the dialectical style that characterizes the Summa,
Aquinas begins with the position that is diametrically opposed to his own.
Pseudo-Dionysius states in the first chapter of On Divine Names that “of God there
is neither name nor opinion.” In reply, Aquinas acknowledges that the human
intellect cannot cognize the essence of God. However, he adds that it is possible
to know God from creatures, to the extent that God is the source of our mode of
being in the world. Taking this path, it is possible to name God, but not in such a
way that the name expresses the essence of God as it is.
Though Aquinas notes that the fact that God is the source of our mode of
being makes the naming of God possible, he expressly rejects an interpretation of
this according to which in calling God good, the meaning is that God is the cause
of goodness in things (STI.13.2). If this were the case, it would mean that in stating
that God is the cause of bodies, it must follow that God is a body. It would also
mean that all names said of God would be said derivatively of God. The analogy
he draws here to make this clear works with the relationship between health and
medicine. On one view, health is derivative because it is caused by medicine: a
sick dog is made healthy through the efficacy of a medicine. But on another view,
health is said primarily of an animal: “This dog is in a state of good health.” It is
10 I have used the translation of the Summa Theologiae in the Hackett Aquinas series. See
Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on the Divine Nature. Summa Theologiae I 1–13, trans. B. J. Shan-
ley, Indianapolis (Hackett Publishing Co.) 2006.
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the latter view that corresponds to the relationship between God and God’s
creatures. The primacy is with God. It is not that God is like us; rather, we are like
God. We can only find names for God on the basis of our human experience. What
we know of God from creatures, we know only to the extent that they represent
God. God is perfect; therefore God prepossesses in God’s self all the perfections.
So creatures represent imperfectly the divine excellences. The effects—goodness,
wisdom—have some likeness to God. This is the basis of the analogy.
Thus, when we say “God is good” the inference we take should not be that
God is the cause of goodness; rather, we should take this to mean that what we
call “good” in creatures pre-exists in God—albeit in a perfect form. So the salient
fact is not that we can call God “good” because God is the cause of goodness in
creatures. The really important point is that the reason we observe goodness in
creatures is because it exists in a preeminent way in God and it is God’s essential
nature to share this goodness through infusion into creatures. Aquinas quotes
Augustine from On Christian Doctrine: “Because God is good, we are.”
The reasons for Aquinas’s assignment of primacy to God in analogical theol-
ogy become clearer when he turns his attention to the issue of a metaphorical
naming of God (STI.13.3 and STI.13.6). Aquinas rejects Pseudo-Dionysius’ opinion
that we name God from creatures (God is king, a lion etc.,). His objection is that a
metaphorical naming of God means that God is assigned a secondary status:
“[A]ll the names that are said metaphorically of God are said primarily of creatures rather
than of God, since what is said of God in this way signifies nothing other than a likeness to
such creatures. For just as to say that a meadow is smiling signifies nothing other than that
it is similar in beauty when it flowers to a person who smiles, according to some likeness of
proportion, so too the name “lion” when said of God signifies just that God is the sort of
being that acts powerfully in his works, just as a lion is. So it is clear that when these terms
are said of God, their signification cannot be defined except through what is said of
creatures.” (STI.13.6)
Only an analogical naming of God maintains the primacy of God. The analogical
names of God are said of God not only causally but also essentially. The essence
of the Godhead is goodness, and it is therefore in the essential nature of God to
diffuse what God is to the created order. “Accordingly, it should be said that with
respect to the thing signified by the name, it is said primarily of God rather than
creatures, since perfections of this kind flow from God to creatures” (STI.13.6).
Thus, while it is true that the basis for analogical theology is human experience—
it cannot be otherwise because we cannot comprehend the essence of God—the
flow in its logic is ultimately from God down rather than from creatures up.
In the Church Dogmatics, Karl Barth rejects the method of analogia entis
because it places God and humanity together on the plane of being. An analogous
relation at the level of being—goodness, wisdom, etc.—is established between
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humanity and God. Barth argues that the analogy is more properly established on
the level of act—viz., the act of God in coming to humanity and the act of faith
through which this revelation is acknowledged.
Barth’s point is that through faith—which is ultimately an event that is only
possible because of the free grace of God—the Word of God is acknowledged,
known, thought, and spoken about. The thoughts and words that arise in and
through the faith encounter with the Word constitute a similarity, a likeness, an
analogy to that Word. Barth, in contrasting the analogy of faith with the analogy
of being, expresses it thus:
“Our reply to the Roman Catholic doctrine of the analogia entis is not, then, a denial of the
concept of analogy. We say rather that the analogy in question is not an analogia entis but
according to Rom. 126 the αναλογία της πίστεως [analogy of faith], the likeness of the known
in the knowing, of the object in thought, of the Word of God in the word that is thought and
spoken by man, as this differentiates true Christian prophecy in faith from all false
prophecy.” (CD I.1, pp. 244–245)11
Barth rejects the use of parallels with human concepts and experience in the
quest for knowledge of God because he considers that in the end these parallels
are more of a hindrance than a help. The essential problem that Barth sees is that
what supposedly analogous terms such as lord, cause, redemption, and reconci-
liation entail is so vastly different from what is entailed in divine revelation that
to pay attention to them in developing one’s theology can only result in error and
confusion (see CD II.1, pp. 76–79). Barth refers, for example, to the fact that we
know of lords. But to use our experience of human lordship to refer to God the
Lord is not efficacious. All that it succeeds in doing is to turn us back on
ourselves; it takes us not one inch toward a true understanding of the nature of
divine rule. Similarly, Barth suggests, we know of originators and causes. But the
revealed fact that God is the Creator means something completely different. The
Creator means that one alone truly exists and everything else exists as a result of
the Creator’s will and Word. The notion of creation ex nihilo can only be received
as something absurd. It is a concept that is absolutely unique; therefore any
analogies that we draw based on human experience will lead us away from the
Creator rather than toward him. The situation is the same with other possible
analogical terms such as reconciliation and redemption. If analogy is to be useful
as a theological tool, there needs to be some point of real contact between the
11 The version of the Barth’s Church Dogmatics that I have used is the Alexander Street Press
online version.
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human term and the divine being and nature. Barth claims to have shown that no
such point exists.
In Church Dogmatics II.1 §26, Barth records another fundamental objection to
analogia entis—namely, that it suggests that God can be known without revelation
(CD II.1, p. 82). Barth sees in the doctrine the notion that because the human
person is a being, she can know being as such. She can extend this knowledge of
being even to the being of the One who absolutely transcends human being.
Knowledge of being, then, is considered to be the starting point for a true knowl-
edge of God. Barth finds this unacceptable.
It should be noted that Barth developed his position not so much in opposi-
tion to the analogia entis of Thomas Aquinas, but to that of the German Jesuit
philosopher-theologian, Erich Przywara.12 Przywara contends that he has devel-
oped an approach that, while different in some important respects to the classic
treatment by Thomas Aquinas, is nevertheless in continuity with it.13 The German
theologian has a different understanding of the relationship between essence and
existence in the human to that of Aquinas. Essence is what a thing is. Przywara
has a dynamic understanding of the essence of a person. That is, he avers that
what a person is qua human being is not a fixed thing but rather a state of
becoming. Essence is immanent in existence, but at the same time it transcends
it. Existence, then, is the coming to be of essence. Przywara therefore defines
human being as “unity-in-tension” of “essence in-and-beyond existence.” Es-
sence is in existence (immanence), and it is also beyond it (transcendence). This
vocation of becoming that is the very nature of humans is a participation in the
divine life analogically. In the divine life, essence and existence are identical.
God’s expresses the divine essence (love, goodness, and wisdom) fully, perfectly,
in the divine mode of being. That is, there is nothing in the divine nature that is
not fully actualized. There is no becoming in God; God is Being itself (pure Being).
The analogy between the being of God and that of the human person, then, is this.
The essence and the existence of a human being form a unity just as God’s
essence and existence do. But this similarity between the human and God con-
tains within it an even greater dissimilarity. Whereas the unity within God is an
absolute unity, in the human it is a ‘unity-in-tension’ because essence is not only
12 On the dialogue between Barth and Przywara, see John Betz, Beyond the Sublime. The
Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part 2), in: Modern Theology 22, 1, 2006, 1–50; Kenneth
Oakes, The Question of Nature and Grace in Karl Barth. Humanity as Creature and as Covenant-
Partner, in: Modern Theology 23, 4, 2007), 595–616; and Keith Johnson, Reconsidering Barth’s
Rejection of Przywara’s Analogia Entis, Modern Theology 26, 4, 2010, 633–650.
13 This summary of Przywara’s approach to analogia entis is drawn from Betz, 21–30, and
Johnson, Rejection, 635 f.
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immanent in existence but also transcends it. In their being, humans express
Being (God’s being) analogously. God is Being; the being of a human person is a
participation in Being. Because the being of a human person can only be under-
stood in the context of relationship with God, the human person’s existence is
itself a revelation of God.
Aquinas also suggested that there is a real distinction between the essence
and existence of a human person. He likewise does this to emphasize the very
substantial dissimilarity with God. But his way of distinguishing essence and
existence does not have the dynamic quality of Przywara’s approach. Aquinas
simply observes that a human being, imperfect being that she is, can never fully
express her essential nature through her existence. Goodness is part of the
essence of a human being, but in her existence a person is never truly good. What
Przywara is doing, on the other hand, is to posit a dynamic view of essence in
order to show that human being is only that which is reaching up for God. The
becoming that is the nature of essence is expressed through movement in the
direction of God. The human vocation is ever greater conformity to God. Christ is
the true image of God (Heb 1:3). Therefore, what a person is (her essence) can only
be determined ultimately by her relation to Christ.
Przywara and Barth engaged in an extended dialogue on the role of analogy
in theology. In the course of this dialogue, it became obvious to Przywara that
what he thought he was doing in his approach to analogia entis and what Barth
thought he was doing were two quite different things. Indeed, in In Und Gegen,
Przywara sees his work—far from representing the antithesis of his interlocutor’s
approach—as affirming the very values that Barth holds dear.14 He makes two
important points in this regard. The first is that analogia entis adopts the principle
promulgated at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215—namely, that in noting any
similarity between God and humanity, it is necessary to note an even greater
dissimilarity. Thus, analogia entis is not a philosophically driven theology in
which the created world is ordered to God. It does not therefore attempt to situate
God, creation, and creature on the same plane of being. In the theology of both
Aquinas and Przywara, God is Being; humans simply participate in it. This fact
points to God’s “dynamic transcendence,” according to which God is above and
beyond everything that is external to God.
Przywara’s second point is that an analogia entis does not denote a natural
theology, but rather operates in the domain of “the supernatural and the genu-
inely Christian.” The primary datum in analogical theology is the perfections of
God attested to by Scripture.
14 See Betz, 9 f.
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We have seen that Barth claims that an analogia entis seeks to bypass revela-
tion in developing knowledge of God. In a work published in 1927, Przywara
explicitly rejects this position: “… analogia entis means neither a calculation of
God nor a limiting of God within the limits of the creation, but a reverent looking
to God as the one whose self-condescension is already [what constitutes] creation
as creation.”15 That is, it is God’s self-communication in and through the Word
that establishes the true meaning of the created order.
While the perspectives we have just considered may indicate an affinity
between the approaches of Barth and Przywara to analogical theology that is not
immediately obvious, it would be wrong to overlook the substantial differences
between them. The most important of these is as follows. An analogy of being is
founded on the conviction that God’s revelation in creation corresponds to and is
fulfilled by God’s revelation in the reconciliation of sinners by Christ. That is, if
the knowledge of God that can be obtained by rational reflection on created being
is to be true knowledge, it must not be in conflict with knowledge of God that
comes through God’s saving Word. Barth, however, cannot accept such a broad
approach to revelation. The problem for Barth is that revelation through the
creation relies upon the effective use of reason. But reason, while possessing a
certain power, is ultimately defective as a result of the effects of sin. In order for
God to break through the darkness that is in fallen human beings, God needed to
speak a completely new Word—the Word of redemption in and through Christ.
Revelation is nothing other than this new Word in Christ. Thus, any talk of being
must be set in the context of divine redemption of human being.
The question of the relationship between analogia entis and analogia fidei is a
complex one. In making the points that I have, the intention is not to attempt a
settlement of all the major disputes. This is clearly beyond the scope of this essay.
I have devoted space to this discussion because I see it as useful for identifying a
number of principles that I take to be indispensible for any responsible analogical
theology. These principles are as follows. First, the starting point in our knowl-
edge of God is what God has revealed. Analogical theology is founded on the
advent of God in Christ. Related to this is the principle that analogical theology
generates true knowledge of God. An analogy of advent reveals God as the one
who justifies sinful humanity in and through the death of Christ. Third, while
analogical theology reveals similarity in the relation between humanity and God,
it reveals an even greater dissimilarity. The profound otherness of God is acknowl-
edged and respected in responsible analogical God-talk. The fourth principle is
15 Erich Przywara, Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie, in: Schriften 2, Einsiedeln
(Johannes Verlag) 1962, 442; cited in Betz, 6 f.
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that primacy in the analogical relation is with God. That is, God has all the
perfections perfectly and originally; we have them only imperfectly and deriva-
tively. Finally, analogia entis and analogia fidei are not mutually exclusive op-
tions for analogical theology. I contend that these guidelines need to be adhered
to in developing therapeutic analogues for preaching.
This last principle is not clearly articulated in the preceding discussion. It is,
however, a very important one in the context of my approach to analogy and
therapeutic preaching. It is therefore necessary to discuss more fully what is at
stake. In his statements in the Dogmatics, I think that Barth overstates the case in
relation to the failure of analogia entis. There, as we have seen, he avers that an
analogy drawn from human experience can only hinder our efforts to know God.
Barth contends that any human concept or experience that may on the surface
seem to be analogous to something in God’s being and nature is in the end so
utterly different from it that it is of no use in knowing God. There is a chasm
between the being and action of God and human being and action that is so vast
that there is no way to build a bridge over it. It is certainly true that all human
experiences are inevitably more dissimilar than similar to God’s nature and
action. It is said that every analogy ‘limps.’ There is never a perfect correspon-
dence between a thing and its analogue. In relation to analogical theology, the
limp is an especially pronounced one because the finite is set as a likeness to the
infinite. Nevertheless, analogues based on human nature and modes of being do
have the capacity to throw some light on who God is. As we all know, Jesus
constantly used ordinary human experience to teach his listeners about life in the
kingdom. There are no human words or concepts that can communicate fully the
meaning of God’s reign in the world. All that Jesus had, all that anyone has, are
analogies and metaphors that give some sense of it. Thus, to reflect on human
love, goodness, and wisdom does give us a glimpse—an important one, limited
though it may be—of the being and nature of God. This is very significant in
relation to my project in this essay. My approach to therapeutic preaching is
grounded in the assumption that an analogous relation holds between the em-
pathy, compassion, and acceptance that a therapist displays and the divine
therapy. If there is no place for an analogia entis in theology, my project fails. I
contend that there are good grounds, however, for the view that responsible
analogical theology makes room for both an analogia fidei and an analogia entis.
Even Barth finally came to this position, as we shall soon see.
Analogia fidei refers to a correspondence between the Word of God and the
word that is thought and spoken by humans. But, as we have just seen, this
correspondence requires an analogia entis. All of the concepts that we apply to
God’s being and nature are also to be found in human being and nature. There is
no fund of pure God-language for us to draw from that is uncontaminated by
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human constructs and thought forms. The only way that the Word can come to us
is through the language that is expressive of human experience. We speak of God
the creator, ruler, judge, and Savior; of God the Father and Mother; of the One
who is wise and just; and of the One whose very nature is love and goodness. Our
knowledge of God through God’s revelation relies on drawing an analogy between
the human expression of these terms and concepts and the divine expression of
them. To be sure, there is a great dissimilarity between the two expressions (Barth
is right to underline this fact). God creates, rules, judges, and saves in a qualita-
tively different way to human creating, ruling, judging, and saving. But I differ
from Barth in that I do not accept that the fact of this massive dissimilarity means
that any attempt to draw a point of comparison is futile and misleading. Accord-
ing to Barth, God alone uses language properly; our words are necessarily
caricatures of what is in the pure divine language: “The use to which [words] are
put [by God] is not, then, an improper and merely pictorial one, but their proper
use. We use our words improperly and pictorially—as we can now say, looking
back from God’s revelation—when we apply them within the confines of what is
appropriate to us as creatures” (CD II.1, p. 229). The way in which Barth expresses
this idea that God alone knows the real meaning of words could be construed as
slightly odd. GrahamWard picks up on this: “Barth seems to write as if God spoke
an idealized German—a German sounding and appearing the same to both God
and human beings, but which each employs, reads and understands differ-
ently.”16 Barth is relentless in his attempt to point up what he sees as the infinite
qualitative distinction between divine and human words. I think his position is an
extreme one. As long as one continually reminds oneself that the true and full
meaning of words such as goodness, wisdom, redemption, peace, joy, and right-
eousness is communicated through God’s Word, and that the meaning associated
with everyday expressions of these words is flawed and imperfect, it is quite
legitimate to draw an analogy between God’s way-of-being and human ways-of-
being. What I mean by this distinction between divine and human meanings
assigned to a word can be illustrated through a reference to Christ’s gift of peace.
The peace that Christ gives is perfect, complete, and a gift of grace; the peace that
is generated solely from human resources is imperfect, incomplete, and a human
work. If we do our theology with our minds focussed sharply on distinctions such
as this, it is quite appropriate to incorporate an analogia entis.
God is perfect goodness and I am only imperfectly good. The gap here is
clearly immense. But even though I cannot fully conceptualize perfect goodness,
16 Graham Ward, Barth, Derrida, and the Language of Theology, Cambridge (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press) 1995, 28.
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I am at least able to grasp it dimly because I have experienced very good people.
It is therefore true to say that an analogia fidei requires an analogia entis. The real
question is the nature of the relationship between the two. That is, to which one
should we assign primacy? Do we start with rational reflection on relevant human
experience in order to develop knowledge of God? Or do we start with revelation
and use an analogia entis to help us explicate what the Word has disclosed to us?
In Church Dogmatics II.1 §26, Barth discusses a pair of articles by the Romanic
Catholic theologian Gottlieb Söhngen in which he, Söhngen, argues for “analogia
entis within an analogia fidei.” The Catholic theologian goes on to state that “[t]he
knowledge of the being of God is to be subordinated to the knowledge of the
activity of God.” Barth indicates his approval of this formula. He is prepared to
welcome analogia entis into the theological fold, if, and only if, primacy is given
to the analogy of faith. In answering a question after a lecture given at Princeton
Theological Seminary in 1962, he elaborates on this position:
“Yes. Exactly speaking it is true that in the first volume of Church Dogmatics I said something
very nasty about analogia entis… Later on I began to see that the notion of analogy cannot
totally be suppressed by theology. I didn’t at first speak of analogia entis. I spoke of an
analogia relationis and then in a more biblical way of the analogy of faith. And then some of
my critics said: “Well, after all, an analogia relationis is also some kind of analogia entis.”
And I couldn’t completely deny it. I said: well, after all, if analogia entis is interpreted as
analogia relationis or analogy of faith, well, I will no longer say nasty things about analogia
entis.”17
What is true for systematic theology is also true for the theology in the therapeutic
sermon. This latter theology needs to take its lead from analogia fidei, but it may
also incorporate analogia entis. Now that the theological principles that I take to
be adequate have been established, let me present my model of theocentric
therapeutic preaching.
AModel of Theocentric Therapeutic Preaching18
The approach that I take in relation to the use in preaching of analogies drawn
from therapeutic discourse and practice accords with the Word theology principle
17 Karl Barth, Gespräch in Princeton I, in: E. Busch, ed., Gesamtausgabe. IV Gespräche 1959–
1962, Zürich (Theologischer Verlag) 1995, 499. Cited in Oakes, The Question of Nature, 605.
18 I can only give a sketch of my approach here. For a full description, see Neil Pembroke, Divine
Therapeia and the Sermon. Theocentric Therapeutic Preaching, Eugene, Oregon (Pickwick Pub-
lications) 2013.
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of the subordination of the analogia entis to the analogia fidei. The gospel is not
primarily about reason and knowledge of the being of God, though these things
are certainly implicated. It is primarily about the address of God to humanity
through Christ in the power of the Holy Spirit. The central event in God’s address
to us is the word of the cross. It is this word that reveals God as the God of all love,
compassion, and forgiveness. It is in God’s nature and being to reach out to
suffering, confused, disoriented and disordered humanity with a word of love that
heals and restores. This is the divine therapy. It is an important dimension of the
gospel (there are other equally important aspects, to be sure), and therefore of
Christian proclamation. The analogues that are drawn from therapeutic discourse
and practice do not serve as the starting point for the theological reflection on
God’s therapy that takes place in sermon preparation and delivery. That is, I am
not suggesting that we should use therapeutic insights to develop some new
knowledge of God’s healing love. Rather, the aim is to use insights from counsel-
ing theory and practice to find appropriate analogues that not only help to
explain the nature of God’s therapy as expressed in the particular text, but that
also facilitate greater openness to that therapy. That is, the analogues should not
be seen as merely didactic aids. The aim is not simply to provide some interesting
insights. The analogues should be seen first and foremost as instruments that
serve to open the heart and mind of the listener to God’s healing grace. That is,
they are used in an attempt to strike a chord in the listener; to stimulate openness
to renewal and transformation through divine therapy.
A second important principle in my approach to therapeutic God-talk in the
pulpit is assigning primacy to God in the analogical relation between God and
human experience. Though from the perspective of Word theology, the starting
point for theological reflection needs to be the gracious self-communication of
God through Christ in the power of the Holy Spirit, the approach of Aquinas does
have something important to say to us. It is true that in the analogia entis there is
a move from human experience to knowledge of God. One identifies good effects
in the human person—goodness, wisdom, etc.—and then attributes these by
analogy to their source. Using this method, one can assign the names Goodness
and Wisdom to God. But in this method primacy is not actually assigned to
human being, but rather to divine being. In analogical theology, the names that
are used constitute the essence of God—God’s essential nature is goodness and
wisdom—and therefore the primacy is with God. Goodness and wisdom in the
human person are only imperfectly realized; in God they are perfectly realized.
This is because they only exist in humans because God has infused them in us.
This observation bears importantly on the question of the theological legiti-
macy of using therapeutic analogues in preaching. There are two ways one can
construe the use of therapeutic images in preaching. First, there is an approach in
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which it is said that God is like a therapist. Second, there is the view that it is
appropriate to talk about God in therapeutic terms because God is the condition
of the possibility of all therapeutic healing.19 The first is to be avoided. God is the
ground of all human acts of empathy and acceptance. To put it in Aquinas’ terms,
God is the source of the effect that is empathy or acceptance. It is therefore
legitimate to talk about an empathic God, an acceptant God, etc.
The final principle is that the ultimate aim is to use analogues from psy-
chotherapeutic psychology to draw listeners more deeply into the divine therapy
featuring in the text. The temptation to concentrate on the insights from psychol-
ogy and counseling needs to be resisted. What the preacher is trying to do in
practical terms is to use an appropriate piece of psychotherapeutic psychology to
give a fresh articulation of the story of God’s therapy that is told in the text. What
she is doing theologically is to use an analogy to expose another facet of the
diamond that is the comforting and confronting love of God. She is saying to the
listener: “Here is a parallel from the world of counseling that may help you grasp
a little more of the wonder, depth, and beauty of God’s healing love that appears
in our text.”
Let me use the story of the prodigal son (Luke 15: 11–32) to provide a concrete
example of how therapeutic analogies can be profitably used in a sermon. I will
not provide a complete sermon, but rather simply sketch the outlines. Further, I
have not tried to write in a homiletic genre; the language is generally more formal
than I would use for a sermon. The aim is simply to give an idea of how the theory
might work out in practice.
I believe that a case can be made that a shame/acceptance dynamic features
in the story of the prodigal along with the more familiar guilt/forgiveness dy-
namic. Thanks to the work of a large team of psychological researchers, we now
have an in-depth understanding of shame.20 The first thing to say about it is that
19 Tom Oden makes this point in Kerygma and Counseling, Philadelphia (Westminster Press)
1966, 21. Oden argues that there is a “tacit ontological assumption” in all psychotherapy. It is not
just that the therapist accepts the client, but that the client is considered acceptable as a human
being by the ground of being itself.
20 See, for example, Donald Nathanson, Shame and Pride: Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self,
New York (W.W. Norton & Co.) 1992; Gershen Kaufman, The Psychology of Shame. Theory and
Treatment of Shame-Based Syndromes 2nd ed., New York (Springer) 2004; and Raymond Jackson
ed., Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Nova Science Publications) 2010.
For summaries of this research by pastoral theologians, see Donald Capps, The Depleted Self. Sin
in a Narcissistic Age, Minneapolis (Fortress Press) 1993; James Fowler, Faithful Change. The
Personal and Public Challenges of Post-modern Life, Nashville (Abingdon Press) 1996; Neil
Pembroke, The Art of Listening. Dialogue, Shame, and Pastoral Care, Edinburgh (T&T Clark) and
Grand Rapids (Eerdmans) 2002; Stephen Pattison, Shame. Theory, Therapy, Theology, Cambridge
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you can feel shame about almost anything. Some people condemn themselves as
socially awkward, clumsy, and gauche. Others feel dull, incompetent, and ignor-
ant. Cowardice and betrayal are especially potent sources of shame. It is possible
to feel ashamed of one’s appearance, height (or lack of it), weight, disability, or
disfigurement. Shame can be associated with familial or national identity. In
Middle Eastern societies, shame is the flip-side of honor. Honor is a claim to worth
and the social recognition of that worth. In such societies, there is an honor code.
A person feels shame when she or he breaks the code. She or he experiences a loss
of face.
Shame is about feeling inferior, inadequate, flawed. Shame-prone people
don’t think they are worth very much. There is an overlap with guilt, but there are
also differences. I feel guilty over the bad things I’ve done, but I am my shame.
The guilty person thinks, “I’ve done some bad things.” The shame-prone person
thinks, “I’m no good.” In her mind, the problem is not what she has done, but the
self that she is.21 Her thoughts are shot through with self-loathing: “I’m stupid. I
always mess things up. I’m a complete bore. I’m a loser.”
Inferiority shame is linked to what a person sees as defects in her personality
or her abilities—or in both these areas. If we are referring to inferiority shame, it is
possible to make neat distinctions in relation to guilt. There is no guilt associated
with having a dull personality. There is no guilt associated with feeling like you
don’t quite measure up at your job. But when we get into the moral zone, shame
and guilt can’t be so cleanly separated out; they are tangled up together. I think
that this is the case with the prodigal. He feels guilty about his moral transgres-
sions, but he is also feeling a global sense of inferiority and worthlessness. When
people talk about their shame they use images such as ‘dirty’, ‘polluted’, and
‘unclean’. All three seem to fit in the case of this unfortunate young man. His self-
esteem is almost non-existent. The polite way in which a Middle-Easterner got rid
of a hanger-on was to give him a task that he knew would be refused. How could
a self-respecting Jew take a job taking care of swine? This one did because he
wasn’t in fact self-respecting. The first words this lad will speak when he sees his
father are, “I’mnot worthy to be called your son.”
Shame is all around us. Many people who suffer from it do not look dirty and
unclean like the prodigal. But they do feel that way. I got quite a shock when I
read an article written by a scholar that I know and discovered that this is his
story. Since it is in the public record, I am free to recount it for you. Richard
(Cambridge University Press), 2000; and Paul Goodliff, With Unveiled Face. A Pastoral and
Theological Exploration of Shame, London (Darton, Longman & Todd) 2005.
21 Cf. Helen Block Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, New York (International Universities
Press) 1971, 36.
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presents as confident, self-assured, and seemingly comfortable in his own skin.
He’s certainly good at what he does. While this is one side of Richard, there is
another side that very few people see. This is the story that he tells in his article:
“Two years ago…I assisted, as a home hospice care volunteer, a person who was suffering
from AIDS, who died during the last period of my care. After farewelling him and awaiting
his end, I returned home, and woke up in the middle of the night in a state well described by
[the psychotherapist] Kohut [when he talks about shame]… “empty, exhausted, drained,
demoralized…deflated…passive, and weak.” I cried inconsolably over this tragic loss, as I
thought about him.
[Richard goes on to say that the man who died was like a mirror for his own shame.]
[T]here is the self that had successfully done many useful things, and continues to do so,
and the self who for almost as long as I could remember continually told me, ‘You are
shit’.”22
When Richard says, “I think I’m a piece of crap,” he isn’t looking for forgiveness.
What is he supposed to repent of? Is he supposed to say, “I’m sorry that I don’t
like myself very much”? When a person is feeling shame, what he or she is really
looking for is acceptance and affirmation. The guilty person longs to hear, “You
are forgiven.” The shame-prone person aches for a loving, affirming embrace.
The father gives the son who was lost an embrace and a kiss. It is certainly
true that there is some forgiving to be done. The son has seriously injured his dad.
The kiss says, “I forgive you, son.” But what stands out even more prominently
for me is the healing of the son’s shame. The way in which the father goes out to
greet his son says a great deal. In the Middle Eastern culture, a man of his age was
expected to maintain honor by walking at a dignified pace. To run as the father
does means showing one’s undergarments like a teenager. So great is his compas-
sion, so great is his urgency to heal his son’s shame, that he is prepared to bring
shame upon himself.
There are some other strongly affirming actions performed by the father. The
father calls for a robe. This is a symbol of honor. The shoes he calls for are a sign
that he is a son and not a slave. The ring he places on his finger is an indication of
authority. Think, lastly, about the party. The father doesn’t plan a quiet family
gathering. He makes a public gesture so that the whole community will know
about his acceptance of this wayward son.
This is the most wonderful story of grace and acceptance shown by a truly
extraordinary father. It’s also a story about divine grace and acceptance. The
height, length, and breadth of grace are too much for us to grasp. This story helps
22 Richard Hutch, Confessing Dying Within, in: The Journal of Pastoral Care 48, 4, 1994, 341–
352, 351.
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us get a handle on it. The grace of God is like that of this amazing man. The word
‘like’ is important here. Human goodness can only ever be a pale reflection of
divine goodness.
In thinking about the divine acceptance and validation the parable points to,
the image that came to my mind was the ‘mirroring God’. Let me explain what I
mean by this. In the extract from Richard’s article that I mentioned, he refers to
Heinz Kohut. Kohut was a psychotherapist who worked extensively with shame-
prone people. He found that the most effective way to help such people is to be
consistently empathic.23 Kohut uses the expression “vicarious introspection” to
describe empathy. That is, the therapist attempts to view the patient’s subjective
experience from her or his internal frame of reference. In a word, the therapist
aims to be fully responsive to the patient and her experience of herself and the
world.24 Shame-prone persons commonly report that they feel ignored, misunder-
stood, treated in a dismissive manner, and rejected. Kohut developed a therapeu-
tic approach in which such persons are genuinely understood, confirmed, and
recognized as unique individuals. An important aspect of the empathic process is
what he called “mirroring.” Mirroring is a relational stance which communicates
confirmation, admiration, and approval.25 It is descriptive of what naturally takes
place when loving parents interact with their young children. When the child
reacts with delight over something good that she has done, the parents mirror her
joy and excitement. Their faces light up in response to the child’s beaming
expression. The child sees her delight reflected on the faces of her parents. In this
way, they confirm her achievement and, more significantly, they confirm her. This
dynamic is an important part of the process of building self-confidence and a
sense of worth.
It’s always a risky thing to draws lines of connection between God’s activity
and human activity. There is an infinite, qualitative distinction between us and
God. There is therefore more dissimilarity than similarity between the way God
mirrors and the way a therapist mirrors. But thinking of God as a mirror, as an
infinite source of understanding, acceptance, and validation, helps me, at least,
to go deeper into the story of the father who threw his arms wide open to greet his
wayward son.
23 See Heinz Kohut, The Analysis of the Self, New York (International Universities Press) 1971,
92 f, 148 f, 271 f, 276–295; and idem, The Restoration of the Self, New York (International Univer-
sities Press) 1977, 302–310.
24 See Howard Bacal, The Essence of Kohut’s Work and the Progression of Self Psychology, in:
Psychoanalytic Dialogues 5, 3, 1995, 353–366, esp. 356.
25 See Kohut (n. 23), 1971 116 f.
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I also want to make it clear that it’s not the case that God is like a mirroring
therapist. It’s the other way round. God is the ground of every empathic and
affirming act by a therapist. Every such act is a participation in divine love,
acceptance, and confirmation. The power of God’s love and grace makes mirror-
ing possible—even when a therapist is not aware of it.
The mirroring God says to us, “In my eyes, you are right, good, full of
quality.”26 It’s not that we are so wonderful that God cannot help but offer positive
mirroring. Is the prodigal a wonderful person? We are talking about grace here.
But we don’t know how to talk about it, really. We don’t have the words or the
concepts to fully capture the nature of divine love and acceptance. So we tell a
story of a father who rushes toward his wayward son to give him a kiss and a bear
hug. Or we point to the child who is the gleam in her mother’s eye. Most people at
some point feel deep shame and guilt. Tragically, some of us are plagued by these
feelings most of the time. But there is good news. The gospel offers hope, peace,
and healing. The gospel offers a word of grace.
The word of grace is that faith in Christ and in the power of his death justifies
us. Christ’s loving act heals both our guilt and our shame. Not only are we
declared right with God, but we are also affirmed as good and full of quality. We
say, “I am not worthy”; God says, “Let me take you in my arms.”Wemay take the
word of grace to heart: “In my eyes, you are right, good, full of quality.”
Conclusion
I have argued for a rehabilitation of therapeutic preaching through establishing a
theocentric focus. God in Christ, not therapeutic psychology, needs to be placed
at the center of the sermon. This does not mean, however, that psychology should
be side-lined. I have recommended the use of counselling theory to provide fresh
images of God; these images are used to breathe new life into the proclamation of
divine therapy.
What I have proposed, then, is a correlational approach. Correlation is a
controversial method in theology. The nub of the issue is as follows. The correla-
tionists contend that the use of psychology or philosophy allows us to grasp an
important aspect of God’s Word that would otherwise remain hidden. That is,
when we approach the Bible with a relevant cultural self-interpretation in hand
we see more than we saw before. The opponents, on the other hand, argue that
26 I am indebted to Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendell for this expression. See her Self-love and Self-
acceptance, in: Pacifica 5, 1992, 288–301.
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the use of a correlational approach inevitably means that the story of the Bible is
forced into a preconceived pattern. That is, the biblical story gets fitted into
another world with another story (the story that psychology or philosophy tells).
These concerns are certainly real ones. There is a genuine danger that as soon as
a preacher begins to make connections between the text and a particular psycho-
logical theory, she will start to manipulate the theological message to align with
that theory. I have opted for a correlational approach because I make the judg-
ment that the risk is worth taking. Provided one approaches the text honestly and
with discipline, and provided one is judicious in the selection of the counseling
theory that is employed, the correlational work will be legitimate. Moreover, it
will produce valuable insights that would not otherwise have been available.
The type of correlational work proposed in the model has a particular shape:
counseling theory is used to fund analogues to divine therapy. When it comes to
analogical theology, the two contending approaches are analogia entis and analo-
gia fidei. In the style of therapeutic preaching that I have argued for, the analogy
of faith is primary, but there is a very definite role assigned to the analogy of
being. Proclamation of the divine therapy takes its lead from analogia fidei (God’s
revelation of healing love in Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit), but it
also incorporates analogia entis (God’s healing love is the source of the compas-
sion and empathy communicated by a therapist).
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